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Credit Unions and the Supply of Insurance to Low Income Households 
Section 1 Introduction 
One aspect of the vicious circle of poverty in distressed neighbourhoods is the paucity 
of institutions such as commercial banks that provide credit there (see for example, 
Flowers (1999) and Dymski and Mohanty (1999)). Given their characteristics, it 
would be anticipated that credit  unions should have a natural role to play in such 
circumstances.
1 In fact some credit unions are specifically designated as ‘low-income’ 
and are chartered to serve those of modest means.
2  
The central focus of this paper is to develop a behavioural model f or low-
income credit unions where the credit union operates as a financial intermediary 
providing  both  a credit service and an insurance service to low-income members. In 
particular, the credit union enables the low-income household to trade, in an uncertain 
environment, intertemporal claims for financial services and thus engage in 
consumption smoothing.
3 The model is built upon two premises derived from the 
environment within which low-income credit unions operate. First, all members must 
make a deposit prior to being admitted to the credit union. The deposit is similar to an 
insurance premium but one where the return is in the form of an interest payment if 
the member’s income is normal but if income is unfavourable the member has the 
right to credit. Second, low-income credit unions have a well-defined common bond 
                                                                 
1 The US Treasury (1997) documents five characteristics, which distinguish credit unions from other 
financial forms. One of these characteristics is that credit unions are charged with providing basic 
financial services to individuals of modest means.  
2 The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) defines a low-income credit union as one in 
which a majority of members earn either less than 80 percent of the average for wage earners (as 
defined by the Bureau of Labour Statistics) or whose annual household income falls below 80 percent 
of the median household income for the nation. 
3 Exclusion from such institutions does not imply that insurance is impossible – in developing countries 
a considerable level of consumption smoothing occurs despite limited financial infrastructure. This is 
achieved by informal arrangements and the development of innovative approaches to deal with 
informational asymmetries (see the symposium contained in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Summer, 1995, especially the paper by Morduch.   3
that results in greater information flows to the management of the credit union. 
Building upon these premises the argument is developed that the low-income credit 
union is an institution with a particular contract that is designed to operate in a region 
(defined in terms of the credit union member’s expected income) that commercial 
banks exclude themselves from because of the impact of informational asymmetries 
on their contract.   
The model highlights several potential constraints that credit unions operate 
under and the empirical section investigates their prevalence. Low-income credit 
unions are classified into four categories on this basis with the important conclusion 
that only a minority of  even ‘low-income’ credit unions operate in environments 
where their activities will make a significant contribution to the economic welfare of 
the locality.  
In terms of the paper’s format the following sectionalised approached is 
adopted. Section 2 concentrates upon establishing the model and emphasises why 
commercial banks do not cover the low-income section of the market. The demand for 
loans is stimulated by a negative income shock. A central feature of the model is the 
incorporation of a guaranteed level of income that can be accepted as an alternative to 
a negative income shock. The primary characteristic of the credit union contract is 
that it is entered into before the result of the current income draw is known (members 
must make a deposit prior to being admitted to the credit union). This entitles the low-
income member to a loan that will only be taken up if a negative income shock 
occurs. The analysis demonstrates that the challenge facing the credit union is to 
distinguish between those low-income  members on the minimum income guarantee 
who want to smooth consumption in the expectation of a positive income shock in the   4
next period and those who seek the largest loan possible with the intention of 
defaulting. 
Section 3 provides a brief overview of those low-income credit unions 
currently operating in the US.  The data set considered is a panel of 666 low-income 
credit unions with observations available on a semi-annual basis over the period 1990 
to 2000. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. A contingency table format is 
adopted that enables the analysis to determine the differing motivations and modus 
operandi between the four identified sub-groups within low-income credit unions. 
Section 5 completes the discussion with a number of concluding comments. 
 
Section 2 The Model 
 
The demand for loans from commercial banks 
Agents maximise expected utility,  U, over two periods, in each of which income is a 
random variable of the Bernoulli type with mean  x. The outcome N, (where the agent 





occurs with probability of  a. Similarly the outcome P, (where the agent experiences a 







 which occurs with 
probability  a - 1 .
4 The agent discounts future income at the rate  d. A commercial 
bank that advances a loan  L in the current period will demand a payment of rL in the 
next period. 
The model developed in this paper concentrates wholly on the question of 
loans and thus on the situation when  N occurs. If  P occurs then consumption 
                                                                 
4 This construction allows a negative shock to be greater in magnitude than a positive one if a<0.5. 
This provides a more realistic modelling of the impact of unemployment on income.   5
smoothing will entail saving. However, this can be accommodated straightforwardly 
by either commercial banks or credit unions. The essential distinction between the 
two institutions in this paper is on the loan side and for clarity the deposit side is 
ignored. The demand for loans is only positive when  N occurs and its magnitude, L, is 
determined by a simple optimisation exercise: 
  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) rL x U 1 rL x U L x U N U E
L
Max
P N N - - + - + + = d a ad .  (1) 
  The first order conditions are not particularly informative. The result is much 
more illuminating if its generality is reduced by assuming the nature of risk aversion. 
Consequently constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) is assumed and the utility 
function –e
-ax is employed. The optimal loan, L*, is then 
 











  (2) 
where  ( )
a a a a
- - - + =
1 / am / am e 1 e d . There are a number of aspects of this solution 
which deserve to be highlighted. First, the magnitude of  L* is independent of mean 
income,  x. This reflects in part that  m is taken as constant rather than  m(x). This 
impairs the realism of the model but ths is outweighed by the gain in tractability. 




£  then the agent is better off having no loan at all. The utility in 
such a case will be referred to as  U0 and will achieved at some point as  r is 
continuously increased. The third and most important aspect of (2) is that from the 
bank’s viewpoint, if  L* > 0 then the probability of default is zero. This severely limits 
the model’s plausibility if income is low. 
  Default is introduced by assuming that all agents, as an alternative to 
accepting their income draw, are entitled to an exogenously determined level of   6
income,  b, referred to as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG).
5 When, for 
example, the negative income shock is associated with being made redundant b would 
be the level of unemployment insurance payments. Thus default will occur whenever 
b rL xN £ - . In such circumstances and provided that xP – rL > b then the expected 
utility will be given by: 
  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * rL x U 1 b U * L x U N U E b P b N b - - + + + = d a ad   (3)   















 for the CARA case. Now  Lb* is 
still independent of  x but as long as x < x* , where  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] N * x U E N * x U E b = then 
the probability of default is a. The introduction of the default option makes the model 
more plausible but Lb* is still independent of mean income.  
This independence does not hold when the agent seeking the loan is currently 
receiving the MIG. In such circumstances the agent will inevitably default on the loan 
if  N occurs in the next period. As long as xP – rL > b then the expected utility will be 
given by: 
  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * rL x U 1 b U * L b U N U E bb P bb bb - - + + + = d a ad   (4)   
where 
( )
( ) ( ) [ ] r 1 ln b x a
r 1 a
1
* L P bb d a - - -
+
=  for the CARA case. The optimal loan is 
now an (increasing) function of x. When x = b + m/a  that is xN = b then  Lb* = Lbb* 
and the expected utilities under equations (3) and (4) are the same; this point gives the 
switch over between the two loan demand schedules. 
                                                                 
5 The model developed above is in several respects the mirror opposite to that of Parlour and Rajan 
(2001). They have lenders offering different contracts to a single borrower who considers default 
strategically, based on the degree of leniency in the bankruptcy laws. This performs a role similar to 
that of the MIG in this paper where default is generally triggered by a negative income shock, except in 
the case of the intentional defaulter whose calculation is strategic.   7
  The demand for loans is sketched in Fig 1. It is the declining portion of the 
curve that is of central interest in e xplaining the role of the credit union. The first 
point to highlight is the level of income,  x**, below which default occurs with 
certainty, that is, when  b rL
1
m




. The condition  ( ) 1 r 1 < - d a ensures 
that at x** the demand for loans is positive, that is, Lbb > 0. 
  Below  x** the agent has no intention of repaying the loan (he is an intentional 
defaulter, ID); essentially a loan of infinite size would maximise his utility if the 
problem is expressed as a simple modification of (4). At this point it is necessary to 
consider the position from the bank’s perspective and to include this into the optimal 
strategy for the defaulter.  
  Assume that the bank cannot observe  x and that its information is limited to 
the size of loan being demanded by an agent. For example, if  Lb* is sought then the 
bank would surmise that either  * x x / m b £ £ + a  or possibly that x < x** (see Fig. 
1).  Provided that the cost of funds is less than  ( )r 1 a -  then the bank will be making 
an expected profit on those whose income lies between  b + m/a and x*. If an agent 
sought a loan in excess of  Lb* the bank would be alerted to his intention to default. 
This would be recognised by the agent and hence  Lb*  is the largest loan sought, as 
indicated in Fig 1.  
  There are four regions in the demand curve for loans, determined by the role 
of  b. For  x > x* there is no default and  L* is employed purely for consumption 
smoothing. When x* > x > b + m/a  and the agent is employed in the current period, 
default occurs with  N in the second period. For  b + m/a > x > x** the agent is 
receiving the minimum income guarantee in the current period but will repay the loan 
if  P occurs in the following period. If  x < x** then the agent is on the minimum   8
income guarantee and  is seeking the largest loan that he believes the bank could be 
induced to lend him. In the latter case the agent has no intention of repaying 
irrespective of the outcome of the income draw. 
  If it is assumed for clarity that each institution can only offer one form of 
contract then the result is straightforward: the bank will not lend to anyone who is 
currently on the MIG if there are a substantial number for whom  x < x**. The loans 
market exhibits informational asymmetries similar to that modelled by Akerlof 
(1970). Those who demand Lb* are made up of the consumption smoothers who will 
only default with  N and the ‘lemons’ who have no intention of repaying. The bank 
cannot distinguish between them. 
The contract offered by the credit union 
  The primary characteristic of the credit union contract is that it is entered into 
before the result of the current income draw is known and so unlike the bank contract 
the model becomes a three period one similar to that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
In the first period the agent must decide whether or not to join the credit union. This is 
before the result of the first income draw is known which now occurs in period two. 
In the third period the decision on whether or not to repay the loan is taken and so is 
formally identical to the bank loan model. 
The motivation underlying the credit union contract is the exclusion of the 
intentional defaulter. This is achieved by specifying a deposit,  c, which must be 
lodged by all credit union members. The deposit of  c imposes a cost on agents. It is 
assumed that the tightly defined common bond of credit unions give them an 
informational advantage over banks in that they are aware of whether  N or  P  has 
occurred for the agent. This impacts on the intentional defaulter since it excludes him 
from applying for a loan when  P  occurs and yet the intentional defaulter will still be   9
required to reduce current consumption then by  c. The intentional defaulter is 
characterised by a relatively low income and consequently the level of  c can be 
adjusted such that its cost ensures that it is not rational for the intentional defaulter to 
become a member of the credit union.  
The deposit of  c entitles the agent to a loan, l, which will only be taken up if N 
occurs. The contract specifies the rate, s, that will be charged, so that sl is agreed to be 
repaid in the next period. Irrespective of whether a loan is taken out, ct is repaid to the 
agent in the next period. In the case of the bank, saving was ignored as a form of 
consumption smoothing. To be consistent in the credit union case, the deposit of  c 
when  P occurs must have a net negative effect on utility; t must not be so large that it 
gives an incentive to save. 
  The argument developed in this paper is that the credit union is an institution 
with a particular contract that is designed to operate in a region that banks exclude 
themselves from because of the impact of informational asymmetries on their 
contract. Consequently the institutions operate in different areas of the demand for 
loans curve. Banks deal with agents for whom  x > b + m/a while the credit unions 
offer contracts to those for whom  x < b + m/a such that the intentional defaulter is 
screened out. 
  Credit unions thus deal with those on the minimum income guarantee; the 
challenge facing them is  to distinguish between those whose motivation is 
consumption smoothing and those who seek the largest credible loan with the 
intention of defaulting. In the former case the expected utility from joining a credit 
union is:  
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ct x U 1 c x U 1




bb P bb cu
+ - + - - +
- + - + + + - =
d a a
d a a ad a
  (5)   10 
 
If  the result of the income draw in the second period is negative then the agent will be 
in receipt of the minimum income guarantee and desires to increase consumption then 
on the expectation of a positive income draw in period three (a negative income draw 
in this period will result in default). Thus, unlike the bank case, the decision to join 
the credit union will have an impact on utility when  P occurs. The first order 
condition for optimal loan size is: 
  ( )
bb P bb sl ct x l c b U 1 U - + + - ¢ - = ¢ d a   (6) 
and reflects the possibility of default in the third period; if repayment had been 
anticipated then the right hand side would include another term, reducing  l. In the 
CARA case 
( )
( ) ( ) [ ] s 1 ln ab t 1 ac x
s 1 a
1
l P bb d a - - - + +
+
= .  
  A clearer picture of the operation of the credit union is gained from dividing 
the expected utility from membership into two parts, depending on the result of the 
income draw in period two. The expected utility from not joining the credit union is 
given by  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] P b 0 x U 1 b U 1 U E a a d - + + =  and so the gain, G, from membership 
is defined as  [ ] [ ] N U E N U E G b 0 cu - = . In the CARA case this becomes, with the 
incorporation of the first order conditions:     










- = d a   (7) 
G is increasing in  x and  t and decreasing in  c and  s.  G(c=0, s=1)>0 so for some 
parameter values membership given  N  is beneficial. The cost of membership,  C, is 
apparent when  P  occurs.  [ ] [ ] P U E P U E C cu b 0 - =   > 0  where the sign follows from 
the assumption that  t cannot be so large that the deposit of  c becomes an efficient   11 
saving device for consumption smoothing ( 1 t < d  is a sufficient and reasonable 
condition to ensure this). C is then decreasing in x and t but increasing in c.  
  G and C are graphed against x in Fig 2. If c = 0 then the situation is identical 
to that involving a bank  –  C(c=0) is superimposed on the horizontal axis. Then 
providing  G > 0  all income levels will join the credit union. The range of  x being 
considered is between that for which lbb > 0 and b + m/a. The intersection between G 
and C, at xL, gives the lowest income level for which it is rational for an agent to join 
the credit union. The existence of this limit is due to the deposit requirement  c. An 
increase in  c shifts C upward and G downward, thus leading to an increase in xL. Such 
a result can also be engineered by the credit u nion by increasing  s or reducing  t. The 
particular value of  xL that it chooses and the manner in which it achieves it will 
depend upon its objective function and is examined below. 
The credit union and the intentional defaulter (ID) 
The presence of the intentional defaulter who took on a loan with no intention 
of repaying it was the cause of the bank withdrawing from the loans market for those 
agents with  x < b + m/a. How does the credit union contract perform in this 
situation? Like all members the intentional defaulter will be required to pay  c to be 
admitted to the credit union. Although the credit union, like the bank, does not 
observe  x it does observe whether  N  or  P has occurred. This may be taken as a 
reflection of the greater information available to the managers in the credit union due 
to the nature of the common bond.  
In the context of this model the minimum income guarantee,  b, is assumed 
means tested so the deposit plus interest is effectively lost in the third period when 
default occurs. The choice in relation to joining the credit union will be based on a 
comparison between the utility derived from being an intentional defaulter and that of   12 
being poor. The latter alternative consists of receiving  b on all occasions and thus 
yields  [ ] ( ) ( ) b U 1 U E P d + = . Now the intentional defaulter will derive the same utility 
in the third period as the poor agent; the comparison between the two alternatives thus 
hinges on the second period. The loan sought by the intentional defaulter is the largest 
that a  bone fide member would seek. This will be the loan, 
max
bb l  sought by the agent 
on the highest income in the credit union, namely  b + m/a .  
Thus for the credit union contract to screen out the intentional defaulter it is 
necessary that: 
  [ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) b U c b U 1 l c b U U E U E
max
bb P ID £ - - + + - ￿ £ a a .  (8) 
This is illustrated graphically in Fig 3. The smaller a, the probability of the negative 
income shock, is then the expected utility of the intentional defaulter will be closer to 
A on the chord AB and so the more likely condition (8) is met. If  b is small then the 
slope of the utility function may be quite steep at this point and the fall to  U(b-c) 
might be large, making the achievement of the screening condition more likely. The 
central point is that  c is the basis of the credit union contract lever on screening. For 
the CARA case condition (8) reduces to 
  ( )
( ) ( )
( ) 1 e 1 e
ac

















a a .  (9) 
The left hand side of (9) is increasing in c.  
  Condition (8) allows the construction of a function, g(c,s,t) = 0, of which (9) 
when an  equality is an example, which restricts the set of decision variables in the 
credit union contract so that the intentional defaulter is indifferent to joining the credit 
union. The probability of default for those that remain is thus a.   13 
The membership of the credit union 
  The exclusion of the intentional defaulter will also have the effect of excluding 
some of the poor from joining the credit union. For example, if  c was marginally 
reduced then it would become rational for those whose income is close to xL (see Fig. 
2) to join the credit union. Such agents would not be intentional defaulters; their 
default would be triggered by  N  occurring in period three. Thus establishing a 
disincentive for the intentional defaulter has the effect of depriving some agents on  
low incomes from gaining a potential welfare improvement. Thus the credit union 
contract cannot be Pareto optimal. Let  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] P I x U 1 b U 1 U E a a d - + + =  be the 
utility of an agent who decides to be independent of the credit union. Then the agent 
with lowest income,  xL,  in  the credit union will be indifferent between membership 
and independence, that is,  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] L cu L I x U E x U E = . xL will, of course, be a function of 
the decision variables of the credit union so that xL = xL(c,s,t).   
The operation of the credit union 
The first issue to be tackled in a model of the credit union is the nature of the 
objective function. Members include both borrowers and savers: one strand in the 
theoretical literature takes the interest of one of these groups as paramount and 
considers the objective function to be either the maximisation of interest income of 
savers or the minimisation of the rate of interest to borrowers (see, for example, 
Overstreet and Rubin,1990; Smith 1984, 1986; and Srinivasan and King, 1998). Such 
an approach ignores two central features of the institution. The first of these is the 
social welfare motivation associated with the development of credit unions. They are 
a classic example of the self help philosophy applied to low income households as 
evidenced by many unions relying on volunteers to run the organisation.   14 
The second feature is that the division between savers and borrowers is a false 
dichotomy. Insurance and credit motives are in reality combined; the deposit required 
for membership is similar to an insurance premium but one where the return is interest 
if the agent’s income is normal but if unfavourable the agent has the right to credit.
6 
Which aspect is dominant to any agent depends on the outcome of a random process; 
they constitute two sides of the same coin. T o exclude one in defining the objective 
function of the credit union thus risks ignoring a central characteristic of the 
institution. 
The motivation of the credit union is taken to be the maximisation of the 
consumer surplus on loans,  L, to its membership  that is of size  M. The consumer 
surplus is  ( )ds c , t , s L CS
s ￿
¥
= ; only the contribution of loans is considered because of 
their role in insurance. Loans have to be funded so the credit union will be required to 
balance its loans by deposits from members, cM. In the third period the loans actually 
repaid by members, s(1-a)L will offset the deposits that the credit union has to return 
to members, t(1-a)cM. 
In addition to the accounting constraints, it is possible that the constraint to 
exclude the intentional defaulter will be operative. There are two situations that would 
exclude its operation. The first is if the optimal conditions for  c, s  and  t mean that 
condition (8) is satisfied as a strict inequality. The second is that the number of 
intentional defaulters is relatively small and their defaults can be covered by the 
surplus generated by the spread of  s over t. Thus it is anticipated that the default rate 
is positively related to the interest rate spread.  
The optimisation problem facing the credit union is then:   
                                                                 
6 Such linkage of credit and insurance is also evident in the development literature – see Basu, (1997).   15 
 
[ ] [ ]. U E U E
cM L to Subject
CS
P ID
t , s , c Max
£
=   (10) 
The conditions for the optimal choice of  c, s  and t can be presented more clearly if  
income is assumed to be continuously distributed with density  f(x).








= h  means that the optimal condition, if the informational 





s h h =   (11) 
Should condition (8) hold then there are a series of additional terms in equation (11) 
that it is not possible to sign. 
The credit union operates in a three period framework; the agent’s  decision to 
join is taken in the first period having considered the levels of  c, s and t. The solution 
to (10) ensures that the accounting constraint is satisfied in the second period  when 
the results of the income draw are revealed. Consequently  t s >  will imply that there 
is a surplus in the third period. This is optimal because, for example, reducing the loan 
rate will stimulate the demand for loans which will require the generation of 
additional deposits by altering the other decision variables. The result would then 
violate the first order conditions for (10). 
However, if a credit union anticipated a surplus in the third period it would 
consider borrowing funds,  R, from the market in the second and adjust its decision 
variables such that its surplus in the third period was equal to  R r , where r  is the 
market return on funds. The impact can be clearly seen by considering it in two 
                                                                 









x￿ = .   16 
stages. First, l et  R be a cash endowment of the credit union so the funding constraint 
becomes L=cM+R. The equilibrium condition then becomes: 




s L / R 1 h h = +   (12) 
Clearly, the larger R is, the more likely that (12) will be rejected.  
  Next consider the case when R is borrowed. This necessitates the introduction 
of a second multiplier, l2, upon the second period constraint,  ( )( ) R cMt Ls 1 r a - - - , 
into the Langrangian function of the problem, (10). Three points should be noted. 
First, it is assumed that both constraints bite which is reasonable given that in the 






























=   (13) 
It would be anticipated that l1 > 0 and that borrowing would occur for as long as l1 > 
r. Now l2 = 0 would imply that there was a surplus in the second period and so CS 
could be increased by raising  R. The second point is that, given this,  2 1 /l l r= . The 
credit union will take r  as given so it is likely that the optimum for some unions will 
be not to enter the market for funds and to accept the presence of surplus funds in the 
third period. Clearly, if  r is continuously increased, such an outcome will eventually 
















  (14) 
  In summary, the elasticity constraint given by equation (11) will be violated 
either by the operation of the intentional defaulter constraint (8) or alternatively by the 
credit union becoming active in the funds market.    17 
  What does the model have to say about the central issue of this paper, the 
potential role of credit unions in the provision of financial services in distressed 
neighbourhoods?   
1.  The higher the level of a, the probability of a negative income shock, the more 
difficult it is to screen out the intentional defaulter, as shown in Fig. 3. 
Without the operation of this constraint, both the minimum deposit, c, and the 
loan rate,  s, could be lower, so its operation reduces the potential contribution 
of credit unions to distressed neighbourhoods.  
2.  The operation of the intentional defaulter constraint is not automatic. If the 
equilibrium levels of  c and  s are high then the lowest income level that it is 
rational to be a member of the credit union, xL, will also be high so again the 
potential benefit to those with the lowest incomes is removed. 
3.  If the number of potential intentional defaulters is low, then, provided the 
spread between the loan and the savings rate is sufficiently large, then it may 
be optimal for the credit union not to alter its decision variables but instead to 
accept the higher default rate. But the proportion of intentional defaulters 
reflects not only the levels of decision variables but also the incidence of 
distress in the neighbourhood; again, it would be anticipated that credit unions 
in d istressed neighbourhoods would operate under the intentional defaulter 
constraint. 





s h h = . This does not identify the operation of the constraint 
since such a violation can also result from substantial borrowings from the 
funds market. In the latter case the credit union would be generating a surplus 
that would not be anticipated from a distressed neighbourhood.   18 
5.  The operation of the intentional d efaulter constraint would be anticipated to 
reduce the rate of growth of the credit union since decision variables would be 
set at levels above institutions in more favourable environments. Again, this 
constrains the potential contribution of credit unions to relieve economic 
distress. 
Section 3 The Data 
Low-income credit unions, like other credit unions are: democratically 
controlled; not-for-profit; insured; government-regulated; and operated by volunteer 
boards of directors. What sets these credit unions apart is their special mission of 
serving low-income communities. Federal law and regulations endorse this mission 
by giving such credit unions the privilege of raising deposits and capital from non-
members. Low-income credit unions often need third-party deposits, low-interest 
loans and technical assistance to enable them to grow and stabilise their operations. 
Only credit unions that are designated as low income have the authority to accept 
nonmember deposits, the most likely source of which are the larger credit unions, 
banks seeking Community Reinvestment Act credit, local businesses and foundations.  
The National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUA) created the Office 
of Community Development Credit Unions in early 1994 to provide counselling to 
low-income credit unions and to administer the agency's Community Development 
Revolving Loan Program (CDRLP). To qualify for the below market-rate loans and 
free technical assistance grants provided through the CDRLP, community 
development credit unions must apply and receive the special "low-income" 
designation. The heart of the NCUA's effort to assist low-income credit unions is 
through the Revolving Loan Program. Under the agency's stewardship since 1987, the 
CDRLP's original $6 million appropriation has b een revolved into $13 million in 
loans.    19 
Some low-income credit unions offer basic services one or two days a week in 
church halls. Others have modern, full-service facilities, complete with ATMs.  All 
low-income credit unions offer small personal loans. S ome provide larger loans for 
housing, agriculture, small and minority businesses, and nonprofit organizations.  
Tansey (2001) argues that at the end of the 1990s low-income credit unions had $6 
billion in assets with a capital ratio of 12.1 percent (the average capital ratio for all 
credit unions was 11 percent). Their loan portfolio was made up of: used autos 24 
percent, first mortgages 22 percent, new autos 16 percent, unsecured loans 10 percent, 
other real assets 6 percent and credit cards 5 percent. Not withstanding the higher risk 
profiles of their constituencies, low-income credit unions ran only a marginally higher 
delinquency and charge-off rate than the credit union sector as a whole (Tansey, op. 
cit.).  
Callaghan Associates have provided the data e mployed in this study. It is 
presented on a semi-annual basis and covers twenty observations in the period from 
June 1990 to December 1999. There are 704 credit unions designated as low-income. 
Of this number complete and usable data for the entire period was available for 666 
cases.  
Section 4 Empirical Analysis 
This section seeks to identify those credit unions where the intentional 
defaulter constraint operates and to analyse its consequences. The maximisation of the 





s h h = , (11), provided that the intentional defaulter constraint does not bite 
and activities in the funds market are minor. If the latter does not hold, there are two 
potential consequences. First, the accounting constraint in (10), L = cM, is changed to 
L = cM + R  which implies that (11) is changed to (12) and so the former is quite   20 
likely to be rejected. Second, changes in  r are likely to affect  s. Thus credit unions 
where the intentional defaulter constraint bites can be identified by violation of (11) 
together with the levels of decision variables not being affected by the rate on funds. 
Such a linkage would also follow from competitive pressures from commercial banks 
(Feinberg (2001)). 
The contract that the credit union sells is in essence an insurance one and 
changes in the price of loans from commercial banks have no impact since the 
membership of the credit union are by assumption excluded from commercial banks. 
The first order conditions of the optimisation problem, (10), contains integrals of the 
derivatives of  L, total loans. The economic impact of the credit union’s 
neighbourhood is thus seen through the effect on the demand for loans. While an 
increase in the unemployment rate or a fall in personal income will increase the 
demand for loans, an increase in the rate of interest in itself should generally have no 
effect. 
The degree of integration of the credit union with financial markets is tested 
by regressing the logs of the decision variables, dj, upon the variables, Y, namely state 
average personal income per worker,  INC, the price level,  PRICE, and the 
unemployment rate,  U, and the current and lagged values of the federal funds rate, 
fed: 
 
e b b b a + + + + = - - 2 t 2 1 t 1 t 0 j fed fed fed Y d
  (15) 
Then the test is simply that of  0 2 1 0 = = = b b b .  
  To test the equality constraint on the elasticities, equation (11), requires 
estimating them from running two regressions of the logs of membership and   21 
aggregate loans on the logs of the decision variables, c, s and t, the variables, Y, and a 
dummy variable, X, that represents the half year to which the observation pertains. 
 
e b b b b b
e a a a a a
+ + + + + =
+ + + + + =
Y ln X t ln c ln s ln L ln
Y ln X t ln c ln s ln M ln
5 4 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1 .  (16) 
  The model of the credit union that has been presented is one of a monopoly. 
This is reasonable because o f the nature of the common bond. However, the 
consequence is that the values of the decision variable elasticities are determined by 
local conditions given the population defined by the common bond. This is not the 
typical panel data problem where a common technology or preference structure is 
assumed. Because the optimal levels of the decision variables are a function of the 
unique distribution of income of the particular population served by the credit union, a 
separate test will be run for each case. There is no aggregation of results as even the 
random coefficients model has no role to play since there is no reason to presume that 
the parameters of each credit union should represent a random draw from a particular 
distribution. The results will thus be a ssessed in terms of the frequencies with which 
the restrictions are accepted or rejected. In addition there is no reason to assume that 
credit unions are homogeneous. 
  The first step is to estimate (16) and test  1 1 0 : H b a = ; rejection of this 
identifies that the credit union is either operating under the  intentional defaulter 
constraint or that it is active in the funds market. Ordinary least squares estimation of 
(16) reveals that autocorrelation is problem. The mean Durbin-Watson statistic for the 
loan (membership) regression is 1.540 (1.643) with a standard deviation of 0.411 
(0.435). The 5% critical values range from 0.595 to 2.339 and so are not reassuring. 
Consequently the variables were subjected to the Prais-Winsten transformation using 
the Durbin-Watson statistic as an estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient. The two   22 
equations were then estimated as a SUR system. Let yi , Wi , i = L(oans), M(embers) 
be the transformed data matrices.  yi  is 20x1 and  Wi 20x7 (three macroeconomic 
variables, a dummy to distinguish which half of the year the observation was made in 
and three decision variables). The residuals from estimating the two equations by 
ordinary least squares were used to estimate  S, the 2x2 covariance matrix of 











Z  the covariance 
matrix,  C, of the (16x1) vector of estimated parameters,  g ˆ , is given by 
( )Z I ˆ Z T
1 ˜ ¢
- S  where  ˜indicates the Kronecker product and  IT is a 20x20 identity 
matrix. To test the k linear restrictions  H0:  r R = g the Wald statistic, 
( ) ( ) ( ) g g ˆ R r R C ˆ R ˆ R r
1
- ¢ ¢ -
-
, which is distributed as 
2 c  with k degrees of freedom, was 
employed (see Judge et al, 1980). 
  The next step involved testing that the macroeconomic and decision variables 
were simultaneously equal to zero and thus loans and membership fluctuated 
randomly about a constant mean in each half of the year. H 0 was rejected for 608 out 
of the 666 unions; in order to determine the factors influential in this rejection the 
Wald statistic, T 0, was regressed upon the macroeconomic variables and the 
characteristics of the union at the start of the period under investigation, together with 
their interactions. Variables that were insignificant were progressively dropped from 
the model. The result, presented below, is interpreted as a descriptive statistic.  
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(The figures in parentheses under the coefficients are the absolute  t ratios. The 
probability value of a test is given in square brackets.  N is sample size). The sign of   23 
the effect of a unit increase in  INC is thus determined by the sign of  0.166U  – 1 . 
Given that the mean state unemployment rate was  5.4% with a standard deviation of 
1.2% the effect of an increase in  INC would generally be positive except for those 
states with high unemployment. The sign of an unit increase in  U on the other hand 
depends on that of 0.102U + 0.012INC – 1; evaluated at the means this is –0.01. Thus 
credit unions in states with higher than average unemployment are more likely to have  
their membership and total loans significantly related to their decision variables and 
state characteristics.   
A charter number is assigned to each credit union on formation. If these  are 
regressed on the age of the union a strong, downward sloping curve results. However, 
there are a number of mature unions with recent charter numbers. Such unions are the 
result of a merger or some form of change in designation. The variable AGECHART is 
the residual from the regression that will identify such unions. If a credit union 
merged during the test period then its membership would increase but without any 
apparent link to either the initial characteristics of the union or its macroeconomic 
environment. Thus the estimated coefficient would be anticipated to be negative as 
indeed is the case.
8  
Only the  608 unions that reject the hypothesis that the macroeconomic and 
decision variables were simultaneously equal to zero are included in the subsequent 
analysis. It was these unions that were tested for (11) and a significant role for market 
interest rates. The results are presented in the form of a contingency table (see Table 
1). Equation (11) is not rejected for 362 (60%) unions and 294 (52%) fail to reject no 
relationship between the decision variables and the federal funds rate. The unions that 
reject (11) are made up of two distinct groups. Taking out those that have substantial 
                                                                 
8 For the 608 significant unions the mean of this variable is 51.4; for the remaining ones it is  –
539.0.     24 
involvement in the funds market (129, 21%) leaves those that are subject to the 
intentional defaulter constraint (117, 19%). The descriptive statistics contained in 
Table 2 substantiate this interpretation. 
The north west corner of Table 1, where (11) is rejected and no link with the 
federal funds rate is accepted, is highly distinctive. It is evident from Table 2 that the 
unions in this group are small in terms of assets, $2.23m ($5.84m) on average, where 
the figure in parentheses represents the  608 cases overall. This is reflected in the 
average share balance, $1130 ($1736). In terms of the other decision variables, this 
group has lower dividend rates, 2.04% (2.34%) and a higher loan rate at 12.73% 
(12.21%).  
This group of credit unions, in the context of the model, faces the intentional 
defaulter constraint. Evidence of this is provided by the delinquency rate on loans 
(6.93%) which is the highest of the four groups. The operation of the intentional 
defaulter constraint, equation (8), impacts on the levels of the decision variables. As 
can be seen from Table 2, the loan rate (12.73%) is the highest of the four groups 
while the dividend rate (2.04%) is the lowest. This in turn has implications for 
growth; membership growth is the lowest at 1.11% while that of loans is second 
lowest, standing at 3.16%. Money market shares as a  proportion of shareholder and 
depositor funds is lowest for this group (1%) which suggests limited utilisation of 
wholesale funds by these credit unions. Intentional defaulters are those on the 
minimum income guarantee: the group under examination is based in states that on 
average have high unemployment rates (see Table 2). Intentional defaulters can be 
deterred from credit union membership by a high minimum deposit ( c) or a low 
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dividend rate ( t): the evidence of the descriptive statistics is that the dividend rate is 
the principal instrument given that this is the lowest of the four groups at 2.04%. 
The  197 credit unions in the south west quadrant are similar to the previous 
group with respect to their delinquency rate (6.38%) but appear to operate in a more 
favourable environment in that the income per capita is higher (and in fact is the 
highest of all four groups) and unemployment is lower. The absence of the operation 
of the intentional defaulter constraint leads to a reduced spread and a higher minimum 
balance. In terms of the growth of either membership or loans the two groups are 
alike; with respect to wholesale funds this group is marginally more active at 1.86%.  
Both the above groups are likely to make a contribution to welfare in 
distressed neighbourhoods, though that of the credit unions in the north west quadrant 
would be greater. The contrast between both these groups and the remainder is 
marked. 
The north east quadrant of Table 1 consists of credit unions with 
characteristics that differ sharply with the two previous groups. These credit unions 
are larger with average assets of $8.47m and an average share balance of $2,110.  As 
is evident from Table 2 the loan rate at 12.01% is the lowest of the four groups while 
the dividend rate (2.49%) is the second highest.  The relatively low loan rate together 
with pronounced activity in the money market encourages growth. These credit 
unions having the highest loan growth (4.77%) and second highest growth of 
members (1.35%). 
The remaining group in the south east quadrant is broadly similar to the 
previous group in terms of average assets ($7.97m), average share balance ($2,090), 
loan and dividend rates respectively 12.04% and 2.65%. The dividend rate is the 
highest of the four groups (the loan rate is second lowest) and they contribute,   26 
together with the most active money market involvement, to the high membership and 
loan growth. Both of the groups in the eastern half of the table would not be dissimilar 
to commercial banks and consequently would have limited relevance to distressed 
neighbourhoods.  
The conclusion to the section on the model maintained that the operation of 
the  intentional defaulter constraint would reduce the rate of growth of the credit 
union. Consequently in Table 3 the growth of both membership and loans is regressed 
upon personal income per worker,  INC, and unemployment,  U, as measures of the 
economic environment that the credit union operates in, and characteristics of the 
union as of the start of the sample period. 
A consistent picture emerges from Table 3. Two points deserve to be 
highlighted. Income per worker is negative and significant in five out of the eight 
regressions. Total membership integrates the density between  xL and xU (see footnote 
5) where the latter gives the boundary above which commercial banks will replace 
credit unions as the primary financial intermediary. An increase in per capita income 
therefore reduces the proportion of the population for whom it is rational to join credit 
unions, explaining the negative estimated sign. In the case of credit unions that face 
the intentional defaulter constraint (N = 117) income is not a significant factor in 
explaining growth; a general increase in income is unlikely to encourage many 
members of such institutions to transfer their custom to commercial banks. 
One of the conclusions from the model (see point 5) was that the operation of 
the intentional defaulter constraint should reduce the rate of growth. This is borne out 
in Table 3 by the importance attributed to merger activity, as proxied by the variable 
AGECHART, in explaining the growth of such institutions. Moreover, a similar result   27 
holds for the other group which would be anticipated to operate in low income areas 
(N = 197). 
Section 5 Concluding Comments 
The low-income credit union is modelled in this paper as an institution with a 
particular form of contract that is designed to allow it to operate among agents that are 
excluded from using banks due to the impact of informational asymmetries. 
Specifically credit unions deal with those potentially on the minimum income 
guarantee, the assumed alternative to accepting an income draw that results from a 
negative shock. The challenge facing them is to distinguish between those whose 
motivation is consumption smoothing and those  who seek the largest credible loan 
with the intention of defaulting. This is achieved by setting the level of the minimum 
deposit and the loan and deposit rates such that an intentional defaulter has no 
incentive to join the credit union. 
An important implication of the model is that the credit union may not be 
affected by changes in the market rate for funds; this is a consequence of its role as a 
provider of insurance services. Only if it is optimal for the credit union to borrow 
funds will its decision v ariables be influenced by the funds rate. The empirical 
analysis demonstrated that less than half of low-income credit unions were in this 
position. 
If credit unions are to be an important agent in raising the welfare of distressed 
neighbourhoods then such an environment cannot be inimical to their growth. 
However, their success requires the screening out of the intentional defaulter and it is 
precisely this constraint that severely limits their potential. Even within the set of low-
income credit unions, only 19% fall into the above category. If the criterion is relaxed 
to include credit unions with similar characteristics to this group, namely that they are   28 
not significantly related to the funds market, then the proportion increases to just over 
one half (52%). The potential of credit unions to address the problems of distressed 
neighbourhoods is depressingly revealed by the fact that low-income unions 
themselves constitute but 7% of the total.  
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                                                                              TABLE 1 
                                                 CONTINGENCY TABLE OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
H0: s  related to r r   
Reject  Accept   
Reject  117  129  246  T2 






s h h =  
  314  294  608   








s h h =  
          Reject                           Accept                                           
H0: s  related to r 
 
  Accept  Reject  Accept  Reject  F  Other 
cases 
Variables             
  No. of Obs.  165  197  129  117    58 
Decision Variables 
  Loan rate (%)     12.04     12.16  12.01  12.73   2.96 [0.032]  12.22 
Div. rate (%)  2.65  2.16  2.49  2.04   9.65 [0.000]    2.46 
Avshareb ($,000)  2.09  1.55  2.11  1.13  16.67[0.000]    1.83 
Characteristics 
  Assets ($m)  7.97  4.47  8.47  2.23  9.06[0.000]  6.34 
Assets/Members 
($,000) 
2.35  1.76  2.36  1.30  15.91[0.000]  2.07 
PROPOT
1  3.17  4.92  4.72  7.59  0.81[0.487]  5.08 
Money market 
shares (%) 
3.37  1.86  3.23  1.00  2.62[0.05]  2.76 
Performance 
Growth of 
members (% p.a.) 
1.64  1.18  1.35  1.11  1.26[0.286]  1.26 
Growth of loans 
(% p.a.) 
3.70  2.90  4.77  3.16  6.07[0.000]  3.24 




35.96  37.34  35.46  36.68  4.74[0.003]  36.25 
Unemployment 
(%) 
5.49  5.31  5.30  5.59  2.03[0.108]  5.26 
 





THE DETERMINANTS OF MEMBERSHIP AND LOAN GROWTH 
  Membership  Loans 
N  as in Table 1  165  197  129  117  165  197  129  117 
















INC  -0.753 
(1.96)** 
  -0.754 
(1.91)** 







U      0.003 
(1.96)** 
         










  -0.0005 
(1.76)** 
Branches  0.003 
(2.45)* 















    -0.0007 
(2.08)* 
 
Mem.(000’s)        -0.0098 
(3.35)* 
       
AGECHART(10
7)    3.624 
(2.78)* 
  4.27 
(3.83)* 
  6.231 
(3.00)* 
  6.368 
(3.114)* 
PROPOT  0.002 
(5.461)* 
      0.0008 
(2.09)* 
     
R
2  0.213  0.044  0.164  0.225  0.147  0.146  0.112  0.084 




















     















THE DEMAND FOR LOANS 
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BENEFIT AND COST OF CREDIT UNION 
MEMBERSHIP 
aG(c,s,t)   
Expected Income 
       xL                          b+m/a 
(1-a)C(c,t) 
Expected 






SCREENING OUT THE INTENTIONAL DEFAULTER 
U 
Utility 
    b-c       b                                                 b-c+lbb
max 
Consumption 
( ) ( ) ( ) c b U 1 l c b U
max
bb - - + + - l l  
B 
C 